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1. Introduction 
 
In political economy and public finance, the linkage between government decentralization and 
the quality of public sector services has been much debated. However, empirical evidence is 
limited  since,  in  general,  the  quality  of  public  sector  activities  is  hard  to  measure,  and 
decentralization varies mainly across countries. In this paper we utilize a country panel based 
on several comparative international achievement tests of students to quantify the quality of 
compulsory  education,  and  estimate  the  effect  of  public  sector  spending  decentralization 
within a panel data framework. 
 
 
2. Related literature 
 
Oates  (1972)  argues that,  in  general,  more  decentralized  political  decision-making  allows 
better  adjustment  of  (local)  supplies  to  locally  heterogeneous  demands.  In  the  model  of 
Hoxby (1999), public school productivity is higher with decentralized financing through local 
property taxes since Tiebout mechanisms reveal important information on local preferences. 
In  Seabright’s  (1996)  framework  with  incomplete  contracts,  the  main  advantage  of 
decentralization is that it is easier to hold decision-makers accountable. For other, possibly 
detrimental effects of decentralization, see, e.g., Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer (2008).   
 
In the economics of education literature, the empirical evidence mainly supports the view that 
decentralized education systems improve on student achievement. In a cross-country analysis, 
Wößmann (2003) finds that school autonomy exerts a beneficial impact. Hoxby and Rockoff 
(2004) report that autonomous charter schools perform better than public sector schools in the 
US,  Clark  (2009)  identifies  a  positive  effect  of  a  major  reform  granting  larger  school 
autonomy in the U.K. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2002) show that the decision to decentralize 
public education in the early 1990s raised student achievement in Argentina, while Naper 
(2010) reports that decentralized hiring of teachers increases school effectiveness in Norway. 
On  the  other  hand,  Merrouche  (2007)  finds  that  decentralization  of  education  spending 
responsibility  in  Spain  did  not  affect  the  illiteracy  rate.  Regarding  general  government 
decentralization, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) identify for 26 Swiss states a positive effect   3 
on  the  share  of  high  school  graduates  in  the  19-year  old  population.  The  literature  is 
inconclusive  on  whether  measures  of  school  spending  decentralization  just  approximate 




3. The Model and Data 
 
Our empirical model focuses on the relationship between school quality and public sector 
decentralization. We define school quality in terms of achievement in test scores obtained 
from  all  six  available  comparative  international  achievement  tests  from  1980  to  2000 
assessing  students  aged  13-15  years.
1  We  use  the  national  average  of  the  scores  in 
mathematics and natural science tests, and standardize them in order to ensure comparability 
across tests. Our procedure standardizes the test scores for the most frequently participating 
(“core”) countries. For each test, the mean of our adjusted score is set equal to zero with 
standard deviation of unity within the group of “core” countries. For a given test, the overall 
average value then depends on the test performance in “non-core” countries, and consequently 
on which “non-core” countries participated or not.
2  
 
Decentralization is commonly defined as the percentage of sub-national government spending 
in general government spending, calculated by the World Bank up to 1999.
3 Keman (2000) 
and Treisman (2000) argue that it is important to distinguish discretion in terms of financial 
policy  implementations  by  local  administrations  (‘the  right  to  act’),  which  we  measure 
directly, from local government political autonomy (‘the right to decide’), which we capture 
only indirectly. Any reform in government decentralization may need some time to influence 
behavior. The size of the lag will depend on to what extent the change in decentralization was 
expected  and  student  learning  is  cumulative.  We  will  use  a  lag  of  one  year  in  the 
                                                 
1 We use the results of the SIMS and SISS tests conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement (IEA) in 1980-81 and 1983-85, respectively, the IAEP test in 1990-91, IEA’s TIMSS 
tests in 1994-95 and 1998-99, and the OECD PISA test in 2000. 
2 For a detailed description of the standardization procedure, see Falch and Fischer (2008a).  
3 The index is more closely described in Dreher and Fischer (2010).    4 
decentralization variable to account for sluggish responses, but will also present results from 
models allowing for more lags in the variable of interest. 
 
In addition, the empirical model includes as co-variates GDP per capita, population size, and 
the size of the public sector that insures against income shocks, particularly government social 
expenditures  and  government  consumption  spending  (for  sources  see  Falch  and  Fischer, 
2008a).
4 Country  fixed effects account for time-invariant features such as  institutions and 
culture (e.g., the national school system, school autonomy, population preferences, etc.). They 
are expected to mitigate potential endogeneity biases. We also include a dummy variable for 
the only OECD PISA test in the regression sample. 
 
The way the dependent variable is constructed is an argument for not including time fixed 
effects in the baseline model. With time fixed effects, the within-country variation in student 
performance would depend on the composition of participating countries in the specific tests. 
The  motivation  for  the  standardizing  procedure  we  apply  is  exactly  to  avoid  this  flaw. 
However, to assess the robustness of the specification, we test for the presence of time effects. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 




For reasons of comparability, we restrict the sample to well-established OECD countries (as 
of  1990)  with  relatively  stable  political  and  administrative  systems,  excluding  the  post-
communist countries. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The standard deviation of the 
dependent variable is close to unity. On average, local government spending constitutes 31 
percent  of  total  government  spending,  varying  from  four  percent  (Greece)  to  almost  60 
percent  (Canada).  For  all  variables,  the  within-variation  seems  to  be  sufficiently  large  to 
justify a country fixed effects specification. 
 
 
                                                 
4 We have also estimated models including the population share with at least a secondary education. The t-value 
of this variable was always below unity, and values are missing for some observations.   5 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table  2  provides  the  regression  outcomes.  Column  (1)  presents  the  simple  correlation 
between spending decentralization and test score. The relationship is positive but small. The 
remaining models (columns (2) to column (10)) include country fixed effects.  
 
Comparing the results in columns (1) and (2), we observe that including country fixed effects 
and covariates increases the size of the effect of decentralization (0.021 vs. 0.072) and its 
significance level (10 percent vs. 5 percent). In the full model (2), the result implies that rising 
spending  decentralization  by  10  percentage  points  increases  student  test  scores  by  0.7 
standard deviations. This is a non-trivial effect given that three countries in the sample have 
within-variations in decentralization larger than 5 percentage points.  
 
Model 2 does not include time specific effects as explained above, but a dummy variable for 
the PISA test of the year 2000, which is highly significant. Notice, however, that if time 
specific effects are included, they are jointly insignificant.
5  Column (3) in Table 2 replaces 
the  PISA  dummy  variable  with  a  time  trend,  without  affecting  the  coefficient  size  of 
decentralization (0.074 vs. 0.072). Since the trend is not significant at conventional levels, the 
remaining  models presented  include only the PISA dummy  variable  but exclude the time 
trend. Excluding any time variable increases the effect of decentralization to 0.088 (column 
(4)). 
 
The  results  in  Table  2  also  imply  that  student  performance  is  not  affected  by  GDP  or 
population  size.  Regarding  GDP,  there  may  be  an  endogeneity  problem  in  the  long-run 
because of a growth enhancing effect of student achievement (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). 
However, excluding GDP does not alter the coefficient size of decentralization.  
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
                                                 
5 The p-value on a test for joint significance using the model specification in column (2) in Table 2 is 0.47.   6 
Public Sector Size 
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 2 show that the positive effect of decentralization is robust to 
the  inclusion  of  public  sector  size,  measured  by  either  total  government  consumption 
spending or government social expenditures (0.074 and 0.073, respectively). The effect of 
decentralization does not appear to be mediated through government spending activities. Both 
public sector size coefficients are negative and of similar magnitude as reported in Falch and 
Fischer (2008a), but insignificant, probably due to fewer observations in the present analysis. 
 
Given that decentralization  increases student achievement while government size tends to 
reduce it, one would expect, in line with the finding for life satisfaction in Bjørnskov et al. 
(2008), that decentralization is more advantageous in the case of large governments than with 
small governments. Columns (7) and (8) add interaction terms between government size and 
decentralization.  Contradicting  our  hypothesis,  both  interaction  terms  are  negative.  The 
performance-enhancing effect appears to decline in public sector size. One might speculate 
whether  market  distortions  through  non-internalization  of  inter-jurisdictional  spillovers 
increase more in decentralized countries than in centralized countries as the government’s 
involvement  in  the  economy  rises.  The  interaction  terms  are  small,  however,  and  only 
significant at the 10 percent level for social spending. The overall effect of decentralization is 




Robustness tests on decentralization 
One may suspect that the small within-country variation in the decentralization measure is due 
to minor changes in, e.g., accounting rules rather than changes in the real economy. However, 
some  of  the  variation  is  clearly  real.  For  example,  the  dip  in  decentralization  by  3.5 
percentage points in Germany in 1991 is a unification effect: The East German Laender were 
fiscally far less autonomous than the West German Laender. The continuous decline from 
1991 on reflects the growing dependence of the East German Laender on federal transfers. 
The  ongoing  decrease  in  decentralization  in  Switzerland  from  1990  on  by  roughly  0.5 
percentage points per year seems to be related to continuously rising unemployment and old-
                                                 
6 The estimated coefficients can readily be interpreted because all interacted variables are centered. For centered 
log of social spending the within-variation ranges from -0.248 to 0.198.   7 
age pension expenditures at the federal level. Sweden experienced relatively large fluctuations 
in decentralization in the 1990s related to the major recession at the start of the decade and the 
governmental  reforms  that  followed  it.  We  have  estimated  the  model  on  subsamples  of 
countries with relatively small and large changes in decentralization, and find that the effect 
of decentralization is stable.
7  
 
The response time of student performance to changes in decentralization is not clear from 
economic theory, but one might expect that some time passes by before structural changes 
start having an effect. The model in column (9) of Table 2 uses five year moving averages of 
all  explanatory  variables.  This  specification  also  smoothes  out  minor  fluctuations  in  the 
decentralization  measure  due  to,  e.g.,  changes  in  accounting  rules.  The  effect  of 
decentralization is now slightly smaller (0.062), but still significant at the 10 percent level. 
When testing for a more sluggish response to changes in fiscal decentralization, employing a 
three-year (two-year) lag of the variable of interest, we obtain a coefficient of 0.052 (0.062) 
(both significant at the 5 percent level, not reported).  
 
Column  (10)  in  Table  2  investigates  one  potential  transmission  channel  for  the  effect  of 
spending  decentralization.  We  test  the  hypothesis  that  decentralization  influences  student 
performance through public expenditures levels in compulsory education (e.g. Fischer, 2005). 
Column (10) adds to model (2) primary school expenditures per pupil as percent of GDP
8, but 
the  effect  is  clearly  insignificant.  In  contrast,  the  coefficient  of  decentralization  stays 
significant (0.100), indicating that its effect is not transmitted through educational spending.
9  
 
                                                 
7 Five countries have within-country standard deviation in decentralization above 2.5 in the regression sample 
(Sweden, USA, Iceland, Switzerland, and Germany). For  this subsample of 17 observations, the coefficient 
(standard error) of decentralization is 0.088 (0.048). For the other countries (68 observations), the coefficient is 
0.066 (0.046), and a statistical test cannot reject that the coefficients are equal (p-value of 0.74). When the 
sample is split into two equal-sized sub-samples of countries with small and large within-country variation in 
decentralization, the coefficients are 0.071 (0.074) and 0.083 (0.039), respectively. 
8  This  data  are  obtained  from  the  World  Bank  education  database.  In  this  database,  there  is  much  less 
observations for secondary education than for primary education. 
9 In principle, fiscal spending decentralization may only approximate decentralization of government spending 
on education, a finding that would be in congruence with the school autonomy effects referred above (section 2). 
Unfortunately, a measure for education spending decentralization is only available from 1997 on, which makes a 
thorough test of the hypothesis impossible. However, the preliminary findings in Falch and Fischer (2008b) 
suggest that it is general decentralization and not school decentralization which matters.   8 
5. Conclusion 
 
A panel data analysis of international student test scores suggests that government spending 
decentralization  is  beneficial  to  student  performance.  This  general  decentralization  effect 
appears not to be mediated by levels of educational spending. Our analysis also suggests that 
this advantageous effect decreases in public sector size. However, further research appears 
necessary on the transmission mechanisms through which the positive effect of local policy 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Mean  Std. Dev. 
Std.dev. 
within 
Min  Max 
Test score  -0.34  1.00  0.44  -2.86  2.10 
Decentralization, lagged  31.3  14.2  1.61  3.84  58.7 
Population size (log)  16.7  1.54  0.05  12.5  19.5 
GDP per capita (log)  10.0  0.28  0.15  8.72  10.8 
Social spending as % of GDP (log)  2.95  0.28  0.09  1.76  3.48 
Government consumption spending as % of GDP (log)  2.94  0.20  0.06  2.41  3.39 
Primary educational spending per pupil (log)  2.86  0.30  0.16  2.14  3.74 
Note. Unbalanced panel data with 85 observations from 25 OECD countries. GDP per capita is measured in 
current 2000 US $. 
 
 
 Table 2: Decentralization and student performance 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Decentralization, lagged  0.021+  0.072*  0.074*  0.088*  0.074*  0.073*  0.059+  0.062*  0.062+  0.100* 
  [0.012]  [0.031]  [0.037]  [0.033]  [0.031]  [0.031]  [0.032]  [0.031]  [0.034]  [0.048] 
Population size (log)  -  -0.765  0.053  -1.244  -1.388  -0.054  -1.847  0.394  -0.266  0.282 
    [1.788]  [2.371]  [1.905]  [1.835]  [1.842]  [1.838]  [1.826]  [0.642]  [3.204] 
GDP per capita (log)  -  0.067  1.812+  1.056+  0.0248  0.109  0.197  0.097  -0.128  0.323 
    [0.647]  [1.017]  [0.598]  [0.643]  [0.649]  [0.645]  [0.637]  [1.762]  [0.948] 
OECD PISA test, year 2000  -  0.465**  -  -  0.461**  0.442**  0.447**  0.421**  0.528**  0.409* 
    [0.153]      [0.152]  [0.151]  [0.151]  [0.149]  [0.147]  [0.196] 
Trend  -  -  -0.026  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
      [0.029]               
-  -  -    -1.299  -  -1.049  -  -  -  Government consumption  
spending as % of GDP (log)          [0.972]    [0.974]       
Gov. cons. * decentralization  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.083  -  -  - 
              [0.054]       
-  -  -  -  -  -0.962  -  -0.851  -    Social spending  as % of GDP (log)            [0.598]    [0.591]     
Social spend.* Decentralization  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.064+  -  - 
                [0.037]     
Primary education spending  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.447 
per pupil as % of GDP (log)                    [0.429] 
Country fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                     
Observations  85  85  85  85  85  84  85  84  85  66 
R-squared  0.0902  0.8524  0.8422  0.8398  0.8667  0.8716  0.8723  0.8786  0.8594  0.8649 
Number of id  -  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  23 
R2 within  -  0.2890  0.1844  0.1721  0.3114  0.3320  0.3402  0.3681  0.2735  0.3169 
Notes:    ‘+’,  ‘*’,  ‘**’  denote  significances  at  the  10,  5,  and  1  percent  level,  respectively.  Standard  errors  are  reported  in  brackets.  
In columns (6) and (7), interacted variables have been centered on the regression sample mean. In column (8), all explanatory variables are included as five years 
moving averages.  